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The attention schema theory: a
mechanistic account of subjective
awareness
Taylor W. Webb* and Michael S. A. Graziano
Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Psychology Department, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
We recently proposed the attention schema theory, a novel way to explain the brain
basis of subjective awareness in a mechanistic and scientifically testable manner. The
theory begins with attention, the process by which signals compete for the brain’s
limited computing resources. This internal signal competition is partly under a bottom–
up influence and partly under top–down control. We propose that the top–down control
of attention is improved when the brain has access to a simplified model of attention
itself. The brain therefore constructs a schematic model of the process of attention, the
‘attention schema,’ in much the same way that it constructs a schematic model of the
body, the ‘body schema.’ The content of this internal model leads a brain to conclude
that it has a subjective experience. One advantage of this theory is that it explains
how awareness and attention can sometimes become dissociated; the brain’s internal
models are never perfect, and sometimes a model becomes dissociated from the
object being modeled. A second advantage of this theory is that it explains how we can
be aware of both internal and external events. The brain can apply attention to many
types of information including external sensory information and internal information
about emotions and cognitive states. If awareness is a model of attention, then this
model should pertain to the same domains of information to which attention pertains.
A third advantage of this theory is that it provides testable predictions. If awareness is
the internal model of attention, used to help control attention, then without awareness,
attention should still be possible but should suffer deficits in control. In this article,
we review the existing literature on the relationship between attention and awareness,
and suggest that at least some of the predictions of the theory are borne out by the
evidence.
Keywords: consciousness, awareness, attention, control theory, attention schema, body schema, biased
competition
Introduction
What is subjective experience, and how could it possibly result from the activity of the brain? Does
it serve any useful purpose or is it merely an epiphenomenon arising from the activity of the brain
without playing a role in its function? We recently proposed the attention schema theory in an
attempt to answer these and other related questions (Graziano and Kastner, 2011; Graziano, 2013;
Graziano and Webb, 2014; Kelly et al., 2014). In a nutshell, the theory proposes that subjective
awareness is the brain’s internal model of the process of attention.
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Figure 1 illustrates the main components of the attention
schema theory. The person in Figure 1A is attending to an
apple. The visual representation of the apple has won a com-
petition, suppressing the representations of other visual stimuli.
This account of the brain basis of attention is commonly referred
to as the biased competition theory of attention (Desimone and
Duncan, 1995; Beck and Kastner, 2009). The outcome of this sig-
nal competition has important consequences. Attended stimuli,
such as the apple in Figure 1A, exert a much greater inﬂuence
than unattended stimuli on other brain systems and therefore on
memory and on behavior.
The apple, however, is only one part of a larger whole.
Figure 1B illustrates a brain that has constructed a model of this
larger whole. The model contains not only the visual representa-
tion of the apple (V), but also a model of the self as a physical and
mental agent (S), and a model of the relationship between them:
attention (A).
FIGURE 1 | The attention schema theory. (A) Visual attention is captured
by the image of an apple. On its own, this process results in the ability to
accurately process the stimulus features – shape, color, motion, etc. – of the
apple, but it does not provide any basis for the brain to conclude that it
possesses subjective awareness of the apple. (B) In order for the brain to
conclude that it possesses subjective awareness of the apple, the brain
requires more than just information about the visual stimulus [V]. It requires
that the brain also have information about the self [S], and about the process
that links the two together, attention [A], such that the larger, overarching
relationship between self, attention, and stimulus [S+A+V] can be
represented. According to the theory, the A component of this larger
representation would not include any of the physical, mechanistic details of
the real process of attention, and so it would appear to depict a physically
impossible entity, a process that can accomplish the same things as attention
without the mechanistic basis for doing so. This brain would conclude that it
possesses a fundamentally mysterious property: a mental possession of
something, a subjective awareness. In this account, the brain’s conclusion
that it has subjective awareness reflects the information contained in a
simplified but useful model of attention, an attention schema.
How does this proposal address the brain basis of subjective
experience? The hypothesizedmodel of attention, or the attention
schema (component A in Figure 1B), would not be a perfectly
detailed model of the neuroscientiﬁc phenomenon of attention. It
would not include anything about lateral inhibition, signal com-
petition, or action potentials. The brain has no functional use
for information about those physical details. Instead, the model
would be more like a cartoon sketch that depicts the most impor-
tant, and useful, aspects of attention, without representing any of
the mechanistic details that make attention actually happen.
Based on the information contained in this simpliﬁed model,
brain B would conclude that it possesses a phenomenon with
all of the most salient aspects of attention – the ability to take
mental possession of an object, focus one’s resources on it, and,
ultimately, act on it – but without any of the mechanisms that
make this process physically possible. It would conclude that it
possesses amagical, non-physical essence, but one which can nev-
ertheless act and exert causal control over behavior, a mysterious
conclusion indeed.
According to this theory, there is, of course, no actual mys-
tery. Attention does have a real physical basis, but the mechanistic
details of the process of attention are not included in the only
relevant information to which the brain has access. The atten-
tion schema theory can therefore explain why a brain would
conclude that such a mystery exists. The internal model of the
self (S) includes information about the body and can therefore
lead to reports about the physical structure of the body, but not
reports about awareness. The visual representation of the apple
(V) contains information about that apple and can therefore lead
to reports about that apple, but not reports about awareness. The
hypothesized attention schema (A), however, contains informa-
tion about the way the brain attends, processes information, and
facilitates action. The information in that attention schema leads
the brain, in this hypothesis, to conclude it has awareness.
This view, that the problem of subjective experience con-
sists only in explaining why and how the brain concludes that
it contains an apparently non-physical property, has been pro-
posed before (Dennett, 1991). The attention schema theory goes
beyond this idea in providing a speciﬁc functional use for the
brain to compute that type of information. The heart of the
attention schema theory is that there is an adaptive value for a
brain to build the construct of awareness: it serves as a model of
attention.
As a comparison, consider the construct of color. Objects in
the world around us reﬂect light in a complex spectrum. The
brain, however, deals in the simpler, computed property of color.
The property of color is computed in specialized networks in the
visual system, and that information is linked to or integrated with
information about the shape and location of objects. In that way,
accessing those visual models, a brain has suﬃcient information
to report that this apple is red or that car is blue.
Just so, in the present theory, the physical reality is attention,
whereas the brain computes the simpler construct of awareness.
Brain B in Figure 1 has constructed a model that depicts itself,
a model that depicts the apple, and a model that depicts aware-
ness, and it has linked those models together. As a result, it has
suﬃcient information to report that it is aware of the apple.
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In another sense, however, the construct of awareness is dif-
ferent from the construct of color. Color is a sensory construct.
A color has a speciﬁc, precise location, often a sharp border, and
can have brightness and saturation, which are precisely deﬁn-
able quantities. Awareness, as a model of attention, would have
none of those tangible properties. Attention has no highly pre-
cise location. It is vaguely inside the head. It is invisible. It
has no brightness or saturation. The item being attended may
have brightness, but not the act of attention itself. Awareness,
as a model of attention, would present a picture of something
vague, without sharp borders, without tangible attributes, and
yet still something real or potent that can be attached to other
items.
In the attention schema theory, attaching the construct of
awareness to a speciﬁc item – whether an apple, or a thought, or
anything else – requires some method of integrating information
across disparate brain areas into a single, larger, brain-spanning
representation (the S+A+V of Figure 1B). In this sense, the
attention schema theory resembles many previous proposals in
which consciousness depends on an integration of information,
a binding of information, a brain-wide global workspace, or a
settling of networks into a single coherent state (Baars, 1983;
Crick and Koch, 1990; Tononi, 2008; Schurger et al., 2012).
The attention schema theory is consistent with these previous
proposals, but also goes beyond them. In the attention schema
theory, awareness does not arise just because the brain integrates
information or settles into a network state, any more than the
perceptual model of color arises just because information in the
visual system becomes integrated or settles into a state. Speciﬁc
information about color must be constructed by the visual sys-
tem and integrated with other visual information. Just so, in
the case of awareness, the construct of awareness must be com-
puted. Then it can be integrated with other information. Then
the brain has suﬃcient information to conclude and report not
only, “thing X is red,” or, “thing X is round,” but also, “I am aware
of thing X.”
The purpose of the present review is to provide some back-
ground for the attention schema theory, focusing on the relation-
ship between attention and awareness. We begin by deﬁning in
what sense we use the terms attention and awareness. We also
brieﬂy discuss the logic of model-based control – the extent to
which a model is useful for controlling the thing that is being
modeled, in this case the usefulness of an attention schema in
controlling attention. We illustrate this point with reference to
the role of the body schema in controlling the body.
The attention schema theory makes a testable prediction. If
awareness is an internal model of attention and is used to help
control attention, then without awareness, attention should still
be possible but it should suﬀer deﬁcits in control. To assess
whether the attention schema theory is supported by the existing
evidence, we review the experimental literature concerning the
relationship between attention and awareness. Although atten-
tion and awareness are typically highly correlated, a large body
of evidence now shows that they can be dissociated. Moreover,
at least some studies suggest that without awareness, attention
suﬀers from some loss of normal control. We argue that this
relationship supports the attention schema theory.
Finally, we argue that the attention schema theory accounts
in a natural way for one of the most puzzling and mysterious
aspects of awareness, the fact that we can become aware of both
external and internal events. Because attention can be directed
to both external and internal information, one would expect a
model of attention to encompass both of these possibilities as
well.
Although the present review focuses on the role that aware-
ness may play in the control of attention, the attention schema
theory has a broader scope. In the theory, awareness, as an
internal model of attention, may play a critical role in social
cognition (modeling the attentional states of others), in religios-
ity (attributing awareness to non-physical beings), in integrating
disparate types of information (such as, in Figure 1B, inte-
grating a self model with external visual information), and so
on. These other aspects of the attention schema theory have
been discussed in detail in other places (Graziano and Kastner,
2011; Graziano, 2013; Graziano and Webb, 2014; Kelly et al.,
2014).
Defining Attention and Awareness
A common claim is that “everyone knows” what attention and
awareness are. On closer examination, however, the usage of these
terms turns out to be quite inconsistent. Here, we deﬁne the
senses in which the terms have commonly been used and inwhich
we use them. Our goal here is to clarify our own meaning, not to
try to impose any normative use of those words.
Attention
Most deﬁnitions of ‘attention’ have something to do with the
selective processing of certain pieces of information more than
others. Because the amount of information with which our senses
are bombarded is typically far too vast to deeply process in its
entirety, some mechanism must exist to determine or ‘select’
which information to process deeply. Much work in cognitive
psychology and neuroscience over the past half century has
focused on which factors determine this ‘selection’ process and
how the brain accomplishes such an operation.
An inﬂuential theory put forward by Desimone and Duncan
(1995), the ‘biased competition’ theory, characterizes attention
as a signal competition within the brain. Signals compete in
order to be more deeply processed and ultimately to inﬂuence
and guide behavior. This signal competition emerges at the ear-
liest stages of processing in the nervous system and is present
at every stage. Competitive processing mechanisms exist, for
instance, even within the circuitry in the eye (Kuﬄer, 1953;
Hartline et al., 1956) and are present in the primate visual cor-
tex (Moran and Desimone, 1985; Reynolds et al., 1999; Kastner
and Ungerleider, 2000). Diﬀerent factors can inﬂuence or ‘bias’
the outcome of this competition. One such factor has to do
with the saliency of the stimulus. Especially intense or salient
stimuli can ‘grab’ attention in a bottom–up, stimulus-driven
manner.
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As signals progress through the nervous system, they are
increasingly subject to the inﬂuence of top–down, biasing sig-
nals. By this method, attention can be internally directed, slanting
the outcome of this signal competition in a goal-directed manner
based on the demands of the current task. Signals that corre-
spond to current goals can be boosted and irrelevant signals can
be suppressed. The term ‘attention’ has frequently been used to
refer only to these top–down control mechanisms, but we use
the term to refer to the entire phenomenon outlined here, rang-
ing from the simple, competitive mechanisms driven by stimulus
salience to sophisticated, top–down control mechanisms. To
attend to a stimulus is to have its representation win a com-
petition, thus gaining greater signal strength, thus being more
likely to inﬂuence other brain systems such as those involved in
decision-making, movement control, and memory.
There are some important diﬀerences between the proper-
ties of top–down and bottom–up attentional eﬀects (Posner,
1980; Jonides, 1981). Bottom–up attentional eﬀects, those that
are driven by salient stimuli, are task-irrelevant, and their eﬀect
on attention is very brieﬂy facilitatory followed by a period
during which the eﬀect is brieﬂy inhibitory. Top–down atten-
tional eﬀects, those that are sensitive to task demands or current
goals, are by deﬁnition task-relevant, and they can have a much
more sustained facilitatory eﬀect on attention. Some authors have
recently argued that the traditional top–down versus bottom–up
distinction in attention research is a ﬂawed dichotomy because
some eﬀects do not fall neatly into either category (Awh et al.,
2012; Zhao et al., 2013). We are sympathetic to these views.
For the purposes of this review, however, we are primarily
concerned with the distinction between task-relevant and task-
irrelevant eﬀects on attention. The brain must control attention
in a task-relevant fashion, and that control of attention, accord-
ing to the principles of control engineering, can be improved
if the brain constructs a model of attention. That model, as
described below, should contain information about the dynamics
and consequences of attention.
Awareness
The term ‘awareness’ is arguably even more problematic and
subject to multiple deﬁnitions than the term ‘attention.’ Many
authors, for instance, draw a distinction between diﬀerent vari-
eties of awareness (Block, 1995; Lau, 2008). Here, we use the
terms ‘awareness,’ ‘consciousness,’ and ‘subjective experience’ to
mean the same thing. We have in mind a functional, materialist
deﬁnition of the term ‘awareness.’ It is probably best illustrated in
terms of how awareness is measured.
There are two common ways of measuring awareness, and
therefore two experimental concepts of awareness: objective and
subjective awareness. In objective awareness, a participant is
tasked with making an objective discrimination about a stimu-
lus – what color it is, what shape it is, or what side of space it
is on, for instance – and to the extent that the participant can
make this discrimination at above-chance levels, they are said to
be objectively aware of the stimulus. Whether or not the partic-
ipant feels subjectively that they have perceived the stimulus, or
whether they regard their responses as ‘guesses,’ is irrelevant to
the psychologist’s notion of objective awareness. This is exactly
the opposite with subjective awareness. Subjective awareness is
deﬁned precisely as whether or not the participant, in his or
her own opinion, has perceived the stimulus. A common way of
assessing this is to give an objective discrimination as described
above, and then to ask participants if they ‘saw’ the stimulus or
were just guessing.
The distinction between objective and subjective awareness
is an important one because there are dissociations between the
twomeasures. In the neurological condition known as blindsight,
for instance, patients can profess a complete lack of subjective
awareness for stimuli in the aﬀected region of space, but at
the same time show objective awareness in the sense of mak-
ing above-chance discriminations about those stimuli, sometimes
even at very high levels of accuracy (Weiskrantz, 1986, 1999).
The patients regard these discriminations as ‘guesses,’ demon-
strating a strong dissociation between objective and subjective
awareness. Similar dissociations exist in the condition known
as hemispatial neglect, in which patients lose subjective aware-
ness for an entire half of space but retain objective awareness
in the sense of showing evidence that they processed informa-
tion about stimuli in the neglected half of space (Marshall and
Halligan, 1988). Additionally, even in normal participants, sub-
jective and objective awareness can be manipulated separately
(Lau and Passingham, 2006).
The attention schema theory aims to explain the nature and
possible function of subjective awareness, the component that is
lost in blindsight and neglect. Throughout this review, we use
the terms ‘awareness,’ ‘consciousness,’ and ‘subjective experience’
interchangeably to refer to the concept of subjective awareness,
unless otherwise noted.
Although many experimental approaches to consciousness
ask whether awareness is present or not, this yes/no dichotomy
is obviously a simpliﬁcation. To address the issue, in some
paradigms, subjective awareness is assessed using continuous
measures, such as conﬁdence ratings, the perceptual awareness
scale (PAS), or post-decision wagering (Overgaard et al., 2006;
Fahle et al., 2011; Naber et al., 2011; Szczepanowski et al., 2013).
A continuous scale for awareness is compatible with the attention
schema theory. Attention can be graded, with more or less atten-
tion focused on an item, and therefore awareness, the internal
model of attention, should also be graded.
Model-Based Control
In order to control a complicated system, it is useful to construct
a simple model of the system. The idea is a key insight of control
theory (Camacho and Bordons Alba, 2004), a branch of engi-
neering concerned with the control of complex systems. Here, we
brieﬂy illustrate the logic of this idea, often referred to as model-
based control, as it relates to brain mechanisms for controlling
the body.
Consider the task of successfully moving one’s arm to grasp
an object. One strategy for accomplishing this task is simply to
try out a set of muscle forces and reinforce those that result
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in success. An alternative strategy is to compute a simpliﬁed
model of the relationship between muscle forces in the arm and
the resulting movements. This latter strategy, model-based con-
trol, has been shown to play an important role in motor control
(Shadmehr andMussa-Ivaldi, 1994; Mazzoni and Krakauer, 2006;
Schaefer et al., 2011). Model-based control is especially depen-
dent on having a relatively accurate model of the body’s current
conﬁguration. This model, referred to as the body schema, has a
few important properties.
First, the body schema appears to be a simpliﬁed, and there-
fore sometimes inaccurate, model of the body’s conﬁguration.
Converging evidence from both psychology and neurophysiology
suggests that the brain relies on a set of relatively robust, but ulti-
mately limited, tricks in order to compute the conﬁguration of the
body (Graziano and Botvinick, 2002). Though these tricks tend to
work well under normal circumstances, laboratory scenarios can
be devised that result in the dissociation of the body schema and
the actual conﬁguration of the body.
Second, this dissociation between the brain’s model of the
body and the actual body has important consequences for the
control of the body (Scheidt et al., 2005; examples of model-based
control of the body shown in Figure 2). Suppose this internal
model is misinformed about the location of the arm. In attempt-
ing to reach to a particular location, the motor system will select a
set of muscular forces consistent with the arm’s incorrectly repre-
sented starting position. The result will be an error in moving the
arm to the new position. Or suppose the brain’s internal model
of the arm has lost speciﬁcity; for example, the sensory nerves
of the arm are numbed and the arm is blocked from sight. In
that case, again, lacking a precise internal model, the brain will
have diﬃculty moving the arm accurately and even in maintain-
ing the arm in one desired location. There may be an overall drop
in muscle output and an inability to stiﬀen or maintain a posi-
tion, but there can also be overshoots in which too much muscle
force is applied. These diﬃculties in control arise because of a
faulty internal model. Damage to regions thought to be essential
for computing the body schema, such as area 5 in the mon-
key posterior parietal cortex or the superior parietal lobule in
humans, can result in similar motor control deﬁcits (Wolpert
et al., 1998).
One aspect of an internal model that is sometimes misun-
derstood is the extent to which it is descriptive of the current
condition, and not just prescriptive about how to accomplish a
goal. With a description of the current state of the body, it is
possible to plan many possible subsequent movements in a ﬂex-
ible manner depending on task goals. One could even argue that
all internal models in the brain, including sensory models, are
control models. When the visual system constructs a represen-
tation of a coﬀee cup on the table, that internal model serves as a
useful description from which a range of possible actions can be
planned – whether to reach for the cup, to avoid hitting the cup
while reaching past it, to aim a penny into the cup in a game of
toss, or whatever other action is task appropriate. A visual model
is a model of the outside world such that the brain can exercise
better control over the outside world. The body schema is amodel
of the body such that the brain can exercise better control over the
body.
FIGURE 2 | Examples of model-based control. (A) To enter a car without
hitting your head requires the body schema to include an accurate model of
the shape of your head. Women who wore feathered hats would develop an
altered body schema to incorporate the hat, and would avoid hitting the
feathers (Head and Holmes, 1911). (B) The body schema depends on visual
and somatosensory input, among other sources of information.
Somatosensory input, however, is less accurate than visual. If you put your left
hand under the table and leave it for a few minutes, the body schema begins
to lose a precise representation of arm position. It is then difficult to point with
the right hand, on top of the table, to the exact location of the left hand. (C) If
the hand is perturbed from point 1 to point 2, but the body schema does not
register that change, reaching becomes inaccurate. In this case, the real
position is closer to the cup than the position registered by the body schema.
The result will be an overreach that may knock over the cup. (D) In some
cases the body schema loses specificity. The position of the arm is not
precisely represented. In that case maintaining a steady arm position is
difficult, especially in the face of external, perturbing forces, and reaching
accurately is no longer possible.
We argue that this relationship – between a real thing, the
brain’s representation of that thing, and the successful control of
that thing – can be fruitfully applied to understanding the rela-
tionship between attention and awareness. In this perspective,
awareness is an internal model of attention useful for the control
of attention.
One important caveat is helpful to keep in mind. A model of
attention might have more than one purpose. Attention, after all,
is one of themain drivers of behavior.What you attend to, you are
more likely to react to. What you do not attend to, you are very
unlikely to react to. Therefore a model of attention could help
in predicting one’s own behavior. For example, if you have any
intuitive understanding of attention, of its dynamics and conse-
quences for behavior, and if you are concerned about your diet,
then you know not to stand all night next to the dessert tray at a
party. Out of sight, out of mind – this maxim is essentially about
the dynamics of attention. A model of attention could also be of
great use in predicting the behavior of other people or animals. If
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you can reconstruct someone else’s attentional state – what that
person is attending to and what the consequences of attention
typically are – then you can gain predictive power. If you are
on safari and a lion is paying close attention to you, get back in
the car. These are general, potential uses of an attention schema.
The following sections focus on one speciﬁc function – using an
attention schema to help in the eﬃcient control of attention.
We argue that because attention is such a complex and vari-
able process, because a brain must control its own attention, and
because an internal model is essential for eﬃcient control, the
brain is almost certain to have an attention schema – an inter-
nal model of attention. We also argue that an internal model of
attention, if it is to be a useful model, ought to have the properties
we normally ascribe to subjective awareness. A creature with an
attention schema should be a creature that concludes it is aware.
We view the control problem of directing and regulating
attention through top–down biasing signals as having much in
common with the control of the body. Attention, much like the
body, can be perturbed by external forces. The arm can be moved
by forces outside the body. Just so, the state of the brain’s sig-
nal competition can be inﬂuenced by especially intense or salient
stimuli. These external inﬂuences need to be accounted for in
attempting to control attention. Unexpected inﬂuences on the
state of the brain’s internal signal competition need to be reg-
istered in order to provide the proper set of biasing signals to
control and, if necessary, enhance or suppress these inﬂuences.
We therefore suggest that a simpliﬁed model of the process and
current state of attention, an attention schema, would be a useful
feature of a system concerned with controlling attention.
What exactly would an attention schema depict, and what
would it not depict? It may be helpful here to compare it again to
the body schema. The body schema does not depict the mechanis-
tic details that underlie the structure and dynamics of the body. It
does not depict speciﬁc bone structure, muscle insertion points,
or the molecular basis of muscle contraction. The brain has no
need for that kind of detail in order to be able to control move-
ment of the body. Just so, the hypothesized attention schema
would not depict the mechanistic details that make attention pos-
sible within the brain. The attention schema would not depict
synapses, neurons, lateral inhibition, or electrochemical signals.
The brain has no need to model its own processes in that kind
of physical detail. Instead, the attention schema would depict
something physically incoherent, a process without a physical
manifestation – a mental possession or experience of something
that empowers one to react to the item. The model would depict
a phenomenon that cannot possibly be understood in terms of
physical mechanism because it lacks any information about or
acknowledgment of physical mechanism.
Why would the brain compute such an incomplete model of
its own processes? Because that is all that is needed for the model
to be useful. Just as the body schema does not need to represent
the mechanistic and cellular details of the body in order to keep
track of its general structure and current conﬁguration, a detailed,
complete, neuroscientiﬁc account of attention is not necessary
for keeping track of the current state and general dynamics of
attention. The attention schema theory is therefore capable of
providing a potential answer to the question of why we are so
conﬁdent in the existence of an apparently non-physical property,
subjective awareness, why we so reﬂexively attribute it to our-
selves – and why scientists are traditionally so stumped to explain
a phenomenon that is, almost by deﬁnition, without a physical
basis. According to the theory, these judgments reﬂect the infor-
mation contained in a model that represents the basic features of
the process of attention but without any of the details that would
be necessary to understand it in terms of physical mechanism.
The theory also provides an answer to the question of whether
or not subjective awareness serves a useful purpose or is merely
an epiphenomenon. It suggests that the model described above
would be of great utility, at the very least, in the top–down control
of attention.
Evidence Supporting the Attention
Schema Theory: 1. Attention and
Awareness are Highly Correlated but
Dissociable
The attention schema theory posits a speciﬁc relationship
between attention and awareness. To assess the plausibility of
the theory, therefore, it is useful to review the extensive previous
literature on the relationship between attention and awareness.
Clearly, attention and awareness are related.Figure 3 shows some
of the many hypothesized relationships between them.
One example of the close link between awareness and atten-
tion is inattentional blindness. Directing top–down attention to
one particular stimulus can prevent a person from becoming sub-
jectively aware of other stimuli (Mack and Rock, 1998; Simons
and Chabris, 1999; Most et al., 2001). Paying attention to a bas-
ketball as it is passed from player to player in a video renders most
people totally unaware of the bizarre and salient stimulus of a per-
son in a gorilla suit walking across the basketball court (Simons
and Chabris, 1999). This relationship between attention and
awareness is so tight, many have argued that there is no diﬀerence
between them and that ‘attention’ and ‘awareness’ may ultimately
refer to the same neuroscientiﬁc phenomenon (Posner, 1994;
Merikle and Joordens, 1997; Mole, 2008; De Brigard and Prinz,
2010).
However, many studies now suggest that it is possible to
dissociate attention from awareness. Some of the earliest demon-
strations of attention without awareness came from the study
of a patient who suﬀered from blindsight. Experiments on this
patient indicated that spatial attention could be directed to spe-
ciﬁc locations in the ‘blind’ ﬁeld of space. This spatial attention
improved the patient’s performance on visual tasks at those loca-
tions, despite a total lack of subjective awareness of the visual
stimuli (Kentridge et al., 1999, 2004).
Subsequent studies showed a similar dissociation between
awareness and attention in normal subjects. When a person is
not subjectively aware of a stimulus because the stimulus is
brieﬂy presented or masked, the stimulus can still draw atten-
tion in an automatic, bottom–up manner (McCormick, 1997;
Lambert et al., 1999; Ivanoﬀ and Klein, 2003; Lamme, 2003;
Woodman and Luck, 2003; Ansorge and Heumann, 2006; Jiang
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FIGURE 3 | Five possible hypotheses about the relationship between
awareness and attention. (A) Awareness and attention are the same.
(B) Awareness precedes attention. One must become aware of something
before attending to it. (C) Attention precedes awareness. One must attend to
something before it can enter awareness. (D) Awareness and attention are
independent processes in the brain. (E) The hypothesis proposed in the
present article. In the attention schema theory, awareness is part of the control
machinery for attention. It is the internal model of attention, the attention
schema. Without awareness, attention is still possible but suffers from deficits
in control.
et al., 2006; Kentridge et al., 2008; Hsieh et al., 2011; Norman
et al., 2013). Some studies even suggest the possibility of attention
in the absence of objective awareness, a more stringent category
than subjective awareness, though there may be some contro-
versy about this result (Jiang et al., 2006; Kentridge et al., 2008).
Many of these examples are in the domain of spatial attention
(McCormick, 1997; Kentridge et al., 1999; Lambert et al., 1999;
Ivanoﬀ and Klein, 2003; Woodman and Luck, 2003; Kentridge
et al., 2004; Ansorge and Heumann, 2006; Jiang et al., 2006; Hsieh
et al., 2011), but examples also exist in other feature dimensions
(Kentridge et al., 2008; Norman et al., 2013).
This set of ﬁndings presents a confusing picture. Attention
and awareness are closely linked, and yet are dissociable. What
exactly is the relationship between them? The attention schema
theory provides a simple, logical explanation for this relation-
ship. The proposed relationship is diagrammed in Figure 3E. In
this theory, awareness is part of the control mechanisms of atten-
tion. Attention and awareness are not the same thing, but they
do normally covary. Their close correspondence is the result of a
well-functioning model. Awareness successfully tracks attention
because it is an internal model of attention. But the brain’s inter-
nal models are never perfect. Indeed, errors in internal models
may be relatively common. Almost the entire literature on the
body schema is dedicated to the study of illusions, or errors,
in the body schema. These internal models are not evolved to
be perfect, but to be quickly computable on minimal informa-
tion and to be useful most of the time. Awareness then, if it is
a model of attention, would be expected at least occasionally to
become dissociated from attention. These dissociations are gen-
erally reported in tasks that involve very dim or masked stimuli
at the threshold of detection. It is in that gray area that the inter-
nal model of attention seems to fail. An analogous case would
be when proprioceptive signals from the body are very weak or
masked, the body schema has diﬃculty updating based on those
signals and the body schema loses a clear representation of the
position of limbs.
While it is now clear that attention is possible without aware-
ness, a more controversial question is whether awareness is pos-
sible without attention. Some recent studies have suggested that
this dissociation might be possible (Li et al., 2002; Reddy et al.,
2004, 2006; see Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007 for review), though oth-
ers have disputed the claim (Cohen et al., 2012). Though the issue
is unresolved, it is worth asking whether that condition is con-
sistent with the attention schema theory. The answer is not very
clear. The theory may allow for awareness without attention, but
there are several caveats.
Suppose that a stimulus activates perceptual machinery in the
brain, such as the case of the apple in Figure 1A. However,
suppose in this case the stimulus is not attended – other repre-
sentations dominate processing in these brain regions. It may still
be possible for the internal model of attention to be erroneously
linked to that stimulus representation, incorrectly indicating that
attention has been drawn by the stimulus. In that case, the
“S+A+V” in Figure 1Bwould be the result of an error in the sys-
tem that incorrectly attached the model of attention to a stimulus
representation that is not, actually, commanding any attention.
According to the attention schema theory, this is all that would
be necessary to have awareness without attention.
On the other hand, two issues work against this possibility.
First, it has been proposed that attention is necessary to bind
together the diﬀerent components of a representation (Treisman
and Gelade, 1980). If that is the case, then without attention to
stimulus X, it may be impossible for the representation of X to be
bound to other information, such as the information in the atten-
tion schema. In that case, the construct of awareness would never
be integrated with the representation of X, and the brain would
not contain suﬃcient information to conclude or report that it
was aware of X.
Second, without attention, a stimulus representation has lower
signal strength and is much less likely to impact behavior.
Therefore, it is much less likely that a person would be able
to actively report on it. Thus, in the attention schema theory,
even if the brain ever did build the construct of awareness and
erroneously attach it to an unattended stimulus, it is unlikely
that someone would be able to explicitly report the condition.
Subjective report would be hampered. In the attention schema
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theory, while attention without awareness is predicted, awareness
without attention is more complex and seems less likely, but is
not entirely ruled out.
Evidence Supporting the Attention
Schema Theory: 2. Attention is Less
Well-Controlled in the Absence of
Awareness
An increasingly common view is that attention and awareness
have no principled relationship with one another. They are
orthogonal functions. This view is based on the reports of dis-
sociation between attention and awareness described above. The
attention schema theory, in contrast, posits a speciﬁc, principled
relationship between attention and awareness. In this proposal,
attention is a complex and necessary process in the brain, and
awareness is a simpliﬁed model of that process. That model may
serve many functions, but one function is to assist in the con-
trol of attention. This proposed relationship leads to a unique
empirical prediction. Without awareness, attention should still be
possible but should be less eﬀectively controlled.
In the same way, if the brain lacks a clear internal model of the
arm, such as in the case of anesthesia of the arm, then the control
of the arm is still possible but is less eﬀective. Without knowing
where the arm is or how it has been perturbed by external forces,
the system cannot easily accomplish goal-directed movement.
Just so, in the attention schema theory, if the brain is allocating
attention to item X but unaware of X, it has made an error in
its internal model of attention, failing to register that its atten-
tion has been perturbed by X. In that case, the top–down control
of attention should be compromised. The scenario is probably
easiest to imagine in the domain of spatial attention, especially
because of the direct analogy that one can draw with the model-
based control of the body in space, but the same prediction could
apply, in principle, to any domain in which attention operates.
Attention could be subliminally drawn to a particular color while
a person is trying to make a discrimination concerning stim-
uli of a diﬀerent color, or attention could be subliminally drawn
to a particular stimulus feature to the detriment of successfully
processing another feature of that stimulus. Regardless of the
informational domain, the general prediction is the same: with-
out awareness, attention should still be possible but should suﬀer
a deﬁcit in control.
This consequence of the attention schema theory is consistent
with at least some previous evidence. In one study (McCormick,
1997), participants performed a spatial attention experiment
closely resembling the classic attention paradigm developed by
Posner (1980). Subjects ﬁxated at a central location on a screen
and a cue was presented brieﬂy to one side or the other. If the cue
was on the left, it indicated to the subject to attend to the right
and respond to a subsequent target stimulus. If the cue was on the
right, it indicated to the subject to attend to the left and respond
to the subsequent target stimulus. This anti-correlated cue pro-
vided a useful test. Naturally the cue drew automatic, bottom–up
attention to itself. McCormick found that, when participants were
aware of the cue, they were capable of overcoming this initial,
pre-potent attentional eﬀect. They were able to pull attention
away from the cue and direct it to the opposite side where the tar-
get was most likely to appear. In contrast, when participants were
unaware of the cue, the bottom–up, pre-potent eﬀect dominated,
biasing attention to the side that the cue appeared, ultimately to
the detriment of task performance on these trials. This experi-
ment demonstrates that, with awareness of the cue, attention to
that cue could be controlled in a top–down manner. Without
awareness of the cue, attention to the cue could no longer be con-
trolled in a top–down manner. Attention was, in eﬀect, stuck on
the location of the subliminal stimulus, and the subject no longer
had the ability to control attention to the extent of prying it away
from that spot.
Another striking example was reported by Tsushima et al.
(2006). Subjects performed a centrally presented letter discrimi-
nation task while a distracting dot motion stimulus was presented
in the periphery. Performance on the letter task was actually bet-
ter when the subjects were aware of the distracting motion, and
performance wasmost impaired when the distracting motion was
subthreshold and subjects were unaware of it. In other words,
when participants were aware of the distracting motion, they
were capable of controlling their attention, keeping it from the
distracting stimulus and on the task. But when subjects were
unaware of the distracting motion, they were no longer able to
suppress their attention to it, leading to a disruption in the central
task.
The eﬀects from these two studies are highly counterintuitive.
In both instances, a subliminal stimulus had a greater eﬀect on
attention than a consciously perceived stimulus. How is it pos-
sible for an unconscious stimulus to have a greater eﬀect than a
conscious one? We believe that the attention schema theory pro-
vides a simple explanation for this counterintuitive phenomenon.
In the theory, awareness is part of the control mechanism for
attention. Without awareness, attention is still possible, but the
brain in essence lacks knowledge about its state of attention and
therefore cannot properly regulate that attention. If attention is
directed at stimulus X in the absence of awareness of stimulus
X, the brain has no internal knowledge that it is attending to X
and therefore the control mechanism cannot easily withdraw that
attention from X, or take that attention on X into account when
adjusting attention to a diﬀerent stimulus Y. As a result, the top–
down control of attention to X, to Y, or to other stimuli is not as
eﬃcient. In that situation, stimulus X has a less well-controlled
eﬀect on behavior than it would otherwise.
An interesting corollary to these ﬁndings comes from the
social psychological literature. Apparently if you are unaware of a
stimulus, it can sometimes have a greater undesirable eﬀect on
your social judgments, whereas if you are aware of the stimu-
lus, you can to some extent mitigate its social biasing eﬀect. For
instance, Bargh et al. (1996) showed that presenting subliminal
images of black faces to white participants can trigger an auto-
matic negative association or aﬀect. This appears to be the case
even for participants who are explicitly opposed to racism and
aﬃrm the importance of egalitarian values (Dovidio et al., 1997).
Similar eﬀects have been reported in other experiments (Devine,
1989; Lowry et al., 2001; Eberhart et al., 2004).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 500
Webb and Graziano The attention schema theory
One such experiment (Devine, 1989) attempted to com-
pare the eﬀects of consciously versus unconsciously perceived
manipulations. When participants were subliminally primedwith
words that activated stereotypes of black people, they showed
subsequent stereotyping biases regardless of whether the par-
ticipants scored highly on explicit measures of racism. Explicit
opposition to racism did not preclude the activation of racial
biases when these biases were subliminally activated. However,
when participants were given a task in which stereotypes were
consciously manipulated, those who scored low on explicit mea-
sures of racism were able to inhibit the undesirable, biased
responses. When aware of a stimulus, participants could regulate
their behavior in line with their explicit views about race. When
unaware of the stimulus, that top–down control disappeared,
such that even participants who were not explicitly prejudiced
could still be induced to behave in a biased manner.
Taken together, the studies summarized above are highly sug-
gestive of the speciﬁc relationship that we propose regarding
attention and awareness. In the absence of awareness of a stim-
ulus, the eﬀects of that stimulus on attention and therefore on
behavior cannot be regulated in line with goals or task demands
as well as when the stimulus is consciously perceived.
On the surface, there is a seeming triviality to this pattern of
results. It aligns with the most common intuitions about con-
sciousness. If you’re not conscious of something, we all know
from experience that you can still sometimes ﬁnd yourself react-
ing to it. Things go on under the surface of consciousness. And in
that condition, when you react unconsciously, you have no con-
trol over that reaction. It just pops out. How can you control it,
if you’re not conscious of it? Everyone knows this to be true. It is
intuitively obvious.
We would argue, however, that this intuitive understanding
is entirely non-explanatory. It is folk psychology in which, with
some circularity, consciousness is the thing inme that, when con-
scious of something, allows me to consciously choose how to
react to that thing. The present theory provides a speciﬁc, under-
lying explanation for these common folk intuitions. At the root of
these eﬀects is awareness as a model of attention. Without aware-
ness, without that model of attention, the control of attention and
therefore of behavioral reaction is poor.
External versus Internal Awareness
A key challenge for theories of the brain basis of awareness
is to explain how we can become subjectively aware of both
internal and external content. Internal content, such as abstract
thoughts and emotions, and external sensory content seem like
radically diﬀerent entities, and yet both can inhabit our subjective
awareness. How is this possible?
The attention schema theory is well-equipped to answer this
question. The attention schema theory holds that subjective
awareness is the brain’s simpliﬁed model of its own process of
attention. But attention is domain general. The most commonly
studied variety of attention is spatial attention, but much work
has also been done on attention in other stimulus dimensions.
Attention has been shown to operate in the domain of color
(Anllo-Vento et al., 1998), motion (O’Craven et al., 1997), time
(Coull and Nobre, 1998), form (Wojciulik et al., 1998), and a
large list of increasingly exotic stimulus dimensions. Much work
has also been done on attention as it operates between compet-
ing stimulus dimensions (Maunsell and Treue, 2006). Indeed, it is
tempting to conclude that attention is a universal feature of brain
function, acting within and between any dimensions in which the
brain can process information.
A growing body of work has focused on attention toward
internal versus external content. The general conclusion is that
attention can be focused on internal content as well as exter-
nal content, and that many of the same dynamics apply (Chun
et al., 2011). Especially salient emotions, memories, and even
abstract thoughts can sometimes suddenly dominate brain pro-
cesses in much the same way that a salient visual or auditory
stimulus might. Attention can also be biased in a top–down
manner toward speciﬁc internal content. The representation of
particular memories, task rules, emotional states, or goals can be
biased so that they are more deeply processed and therefore more
likely to determine and guide behavior.
According to the attention schema theory, the brain constructs
a simpliﬁed model of the complex process of attention. If the
theory is correct, then the attention schema, the construct of
awareness, is relevant to any type of information to which the
brain can pay attention. The relevant domain covers all vision,
audition, touch, indeed any sense, as well as internal thoughts,
emotions, and ideas. The brain can allocate attention to all of
these types of information. Therefore awareness, the internal
representation of attention, should apply to the same range of
information.
Conclusion
We argue that the attention schema theory provides a possible
answer to the puzzle of subjective experience. The core claim of
the theory is that the brain computes a simpliﬁed model of the
process and current state of attention, and that the content of this
model is the basis of subjective reports. According to the theory,
subjective reports such as ‘I am aware of X’ involve the following
steps. Stimulus X is encoded as a representation in the brain, com-
peting with other stimulus representations for the brain’s limited
processing resources. If stimulus X wins this signal competition,
resulting in its being deeply processed by the brain, then stimu-
lus X is attended. According to the theory, an additional step is
needed to produce a report of subjective awareness of stimulus
X. The brain has to compute a model of the process of attention
itself. Attention is, in a sense, a relevant attribute of the stimu-
lus. It’s red, it’s round, it’s at this location, and it’s being attended
by me. The complex phenomenon of a stimulus being selectively
processed by the brain, attention, is represented in a simpliﬁed
model, an attention schema. This model leaves out many of the
mechanistic details of the actual phenomenon of attention, and
instead depicts a mysterious, physically impossible property –
awareness. The brain reports the presence of awareness of the
stimulus because it is reporting the contents of its internal mod-
els. The brain can report only the information available to it
through its internal models.
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The theory is partially based on the logic of model-based con-
trol. Just as the brain computes a model of the body, the body
schema, and uses this model in the control of the body, we sug-
gest that a simpliﬁed model of attention, an attention schema,
would be useful in controlling attention. Certain predictions
about the relationship between attention and awareness follow
straightforwardly from this control-theory approach, and at least
some of these predictions correspond closely with the existing
literature. It is our hope that future experiments will provide fur-
ther tests, and in the process provide an answer to the many
questions surrounding subjective experience and the purposes it
might serve in the functioning of the brain.
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